Fortress and Gatekeeper: Theorizing Transitive Trust in Third-Party Cybersecurity Risk Governance
Formalises transitive trust in third-party cyber-risk governance, offering a theoretical lens for enterprises managing cascading supply-chain dependencies under NIS2 and DORA obligations.
Summary written by editorial AI · Source link below
arXiv:2606.26866v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Third-party vendors, such as analytics platforms, cloud services, identity providers, and software suppliers, are increasingly embedded in digital service delivery. While these arrangements enable scale and specialization, they also move customer data and security-relevant practices into environments that customers rarely see, select, or evaluate. This paper examines this problem through a document analysis of the November 2025 OpenAI-Mixpanel sec
Editorial Analysis
NIS2 and DORA impose explicit third-party risk management duties; a formal trust-transitivity model helps enterprises reason about where vendor-chain assurance breaks down.
Map your critical vendor dependencies against the fortress/gatekeeper trust archetypes to identify where transitive trust assumptions may be unvalidated.
A formal framework for third-party trust chains supports board-level oversight of supply-chain risk under NIS2 and DORA.
Forward-looking interpretation drafted by editorial AI under human review — not a reproduction of the source. See methodology.
External link — opens at arXiv Crypto & Security in a new tab.
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