They Will See Johnny's Message: A Measurement Study of Post-Quantum Cryptography Across Email Delivery Paths
Systematic measurement reveals how far real-world email infrastructure still is from post-quantum cryptography, quantifying harvest-now-decrypt-later exposure that NIS2-regulated entities should address now.
Summary written by editorial AI · Source link below
arXiv:2610.36145v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Harvest-now, decrypt-later (HNDL) attacks make the transition to post-quantum cryptography (PQC) urgent for email. This paper presents a systematic measurement that jointly examines PQC deployment across email service stages, negotiation by communicating peers, and usable message encryption. Endpoint-level support alone does not establish PQC readiness across email workflows because submission, relay, and access use independently negotiated Transp
Editorial Analysis
State-level adversaries are likely already harvesting encrypted email traffic; organisations that delay PQC migration risk retroactive decryption of sensitive communications.
Begin inventorying email MTA configurations for PQC algorithm support and plan a phased migration aligned with NIST PQC standards.
Email systems remain largely unprotected against future quantum decryption—plan now to avoid retroactive exposure of sensitive communications.
Forward-looking interpretation drafted by editorial AI under human review — not a reproduction of the source. See methodology.
External link — opens at arXiv Crypto & Security in a new tab.
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