Shoot on (Core)Sight: Re-enabling Secure Debug on the RP2350 with Photon-Emission Microscopy and Laser Fault Injection
Laser fault injection bypasses the RP2350 microcontroller's secure-debug lock, demonstrating that fault-resistant policy storage does not guarantee enforcement—relevant for IoT hardware trust assumptions.
Summary written by editorial AI · Source link below
arXiv:2611.06386v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Fault-resistant policy storage does not guarantee fault-resistant enforcement. We demonstrated this distinction on the RP2350A4 using differential photon-emission microscopy (PEM) and laser fault injection (LFI). PEM narrowed the area for laser scanning, which found two sites where pulses set the DEBUGEN bits enabling core~1 Secure debug. An online attack sequence using only Serial Wire Debug (SWD) feedback restored sustained access. After rescue
Editorial Analysis
Embedded devices relying on RP2350-class secure-debug mechanisms may be vulnerable to physical fault injection, challenging hardware trust assumptions in IoT and OT deployments.
Reassess physical-attack resilience assumptions for any RP2350-based products in your supply chain or product portfolio.
Forward-looking interpretation drafted by editorial AI under human review — not a reproduction of the source. See methodology.
External link — opens at arXiv Crypto & Security in a new tab.
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