Securing Web Agents with the Compile-Then-Execute Paradigm
A compile-then-execute paradigm for LLM web agents structurally separates trusted control flow from untrusted webpage content, offering a principled defence against prompt injection attacks.
Summary written by editorial AI · Source link below
arXiv:2611.06039v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Web agents commonly follow the ReAct paradigm, selecting each action from runtime observations that inherently mix trusted and untrusted content. This design makes their control flow vulnerable to prompt injections embedded in webpages. We introduce Baya, a compile-then-execute web agent designed to prevent prompt-injection-driven control-flow hijacking by design. Before accessing the live website, Baya compiles the user's request into an executab
Editorial Analysis
As enterprises adopt LLM-based web agents for automation, prompt injection via untrusted content becomes a critical risk; structural mitigations are needed beyond input filtering.
Assess your LLM agent architectures for prompt-injection exposure and consider adopting control-flow isolation patterns.
Forward-looking interpretation drafted by editorial AI under human review — not a reproduction of the source. See methodology.
External link — opens at arXiv Crypto & Security in a new tab.
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