Prompt Injection as Role Confusion
Academic research identifies role confusion as fundamental vulnerability in LLM architectures, revealing why current prompt injection defenses consistently fail.
Summary written by editorial AI · Source link below
arXiv:2603.12277v5 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: LLMs see the world as a single stream of text, partitioned into roles like or . We trace prompt injection to role confusion: models perceive the source of text from how it sounds, not its labeled role. A command hidden in a webpage hijacks an agent simply because it sounds like text, despite its label. We design role probes to measure how LLMs internally perceive "who is speaking," and find that injected text occupies the same represe
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