Context-to-Execution Integrity for LLM Agents
New integrity framework separates LLM agent context reading from tool execution authority, addressing a critical gap as enterprises deploy agentic AI that acts on attacker-reachable input.
Summary written by editorial AI · Source link below
arXiv:2607.06000v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Language-model agents read attacker-writable context to solve tasks. Tool execution needs a separate authority check for protected sink fields, sink-interpreted payloads, and the invocation event. Context-to-Execution Integrity (CXI) is an execution-boundary system for this setting. Policies mark protected sink fields, typed releases carry narrow validated values from writable context to specific destinations, opaque data slots keep evidence as da
Editorial Analysis
Agentic AI systems that execute tools based on untrusted context represent an emerging attack surface; a formal integrity boundary is essential before enterprise-scale deployment.
Mandate authority checks on tool invocations that are decoupled from the LLM's context window in all agentic deployments.
As AI agents gain tool-execution capabilities, a missing integrity boundary between what they read and what they do creates enterprise-scale privilege escalation risk.
Forward-looking interpretation drafted by editorial AI under human review — not a reproduction of the source. See methodology.
External link — opens at arXiv Crypto & Security in a new tab.
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