Agent Approval Laundering: Transitive Effects Beyond the Approved Invocation
Approved coding-agent actions can trigger unchecked transitive workflows—package lifecycle hooks, file writes, MCP calls—effectively laundering dangerous operations through a single human approval.
Summary written by editorial AI · Source link below
arXiv:2609.28586v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Coding-agent approval interfaces bind a human decision to a command or tool call, while developer tools execute the transitive workflow that invocation activates. Package installation can run lifecycle hooks and write files; an MCP call can exercise network authority. We call the resulting record-coverage failure approval laundering: the durable record names the entry invocation but omits effects exercised by its workflow. We present the first s
Editorial Analysis
Enterprises adopting AI coding agents assume human approval gates are sufficient, but transitive execution means a single 'approve' can cascade into arbitrary code execution via supply-chain hooks.
Mandate that coding-agent approval interfaces expose and require explicit consent for all transitive side-effects before execution.
AI coding assistants can bypass human approval controls through hidden execution chains—a supply-chain risk requiring immediate governance attention.
Forward-looking interpretation drafted by editorial AI under human review — not a reproduction of the source. See methodology.
External link — opens at arXiv Crypto & Security in a new tab.
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